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[Crim. No. 4857. In Bank.

Mar. 23, 1948.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN SLOBODION,
Appellant.
[1] Lewdness-Appeal-Review of Evidence.-In a prosecution
for lewd conduct with a 6-year-old girl and for sex perversion,
where the girl's testimony was coherent and consistent in all
its important phases, minor inconsistencies not destructive
of her story were for the jury to pass upon, and a verdict of
guilty will not be disturbed on appeal.
[2] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-In a
prosecution for lewd conduct with a 6-year-old girl and for
sex perversion, any error in the admission of an officer's testimony concerning how the child entered an abandoned house
in which the offenses were committed and what occurred there
was not prejudicial to defendant where he did not object to
the admission of this evidence, and where the repetition of the
child's statement was merely a minor incident in the trial.
[3) Id.-Evidence-Identity.-In a prosecution for lewd conduct
with a child and for sex perversion, evidence by the prosecutrix that she identified defendant in a police lineup after the
offense as well as testimony of an officer that he saw her identify the defendant, is admissible to corroborate her story and
to rebut the suggestion that her identification at the trial was
the result of recent contrivance.
[3] Extrajudicial identification of defendant in crimiD:'.1 case,
note, 70 A.L.R. 910. See, also, 8 Cal.Jur. 36; 20 Am.Jur. 325.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Lewdness, § 22; [2J Criminal Law,
i 1382; [3-5] Criminal Law, § 374; [6] Criminal Law, § 144.

)

556

PEOPLE fl. SLOBODION

l'] Id.-Evidence-Identit:v.-In a prosecution for lewd
. with a 6-year-old girl and for Be% perversion, testlDlony
third person that the child pointed defendant out to
mediately after complaining of defendant's acts, and
she saw him near her house carrying an ice cream cone,
admissible over objection to corroborate her story and .
unreliable as constituting merely an identification of
eream, where there was no indication that she was
at the time.
[6] Id.-Evidence-IdentitJ.-In a prosecution for lewd
with a child and for sex perversion, testimony of a
that he saw defendant outside the girl's house Boon
had complained of defendant's acts, that defendant aWlIUliH
purchasing an ice cream cone for her, and that he lC1entt~1
defendant in a police lineup was admissible to eorrob~• •
his testimony of identification at the trial.
[6] Id.-Former JeopardJ-IdentitJ of 01l'enses.-A person
be convicted of both lewd conduct with a child (Pen.
1288) and of su perversion (Pen. Code, 1288a) with'
same child, although the acts were committed within a
tively short time, where the o1l'enses were not based
lame act and were not necessarily or normally asslOCi.aC81111
with each other.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
meda County and from an order denying a new trial.
jamin C. Jones, Judge assigned. Aflirmed.
Prosecution for lewd conduct with a child and for aex
version. Judgment of conviction aftlrmed.
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131 C.2d 555; 181 P.2d 1]

TRAYNOR, J .-Defendant was charged in two counts of
an information alleging (1) a violation of Penal Code, section 288, which defines lewd and lascivious conduct against a
child under 14 years of age, and (2) a violation of Penal
Code,section 288a, which defines a form of sex perversion.
In the first count defendant was charged with placing his
"hands and private parts upon the bare body and private
parts" of the prosecutrix, a 6-year-old girl; in the second
count he was charged with "copulating the mouth" of defendant with "the sexual organ" of the prosecutrix. The defense
contended at the trial that if the acts complained of actually
occurred, the prosecutrix erroneously identified defendant as
the wrongdoer. Defendant was convicted on each count and
was given concurrent sentences. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and from the order denying a new trial.
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict. As usually happens, the testimony of
the prosecutrix was for the most part uncorroborated. She
could not remember the date when the offenses were committed, but other witnesses established that the date was September 15, 1945. On that day, according to the prosecutrix,
defendant persuaded her to accompany him to an abandoned
house less than a block from her home. A room in the house
contained a bed and table. Defendant removed a bottle of
whiskey from his pocket and took off some of the prosecutrix's
clothing as well as his own. Defendant then put the child
on the bed. He put his private parts into her private parts
and then put his mouth to her private parts. He then sat
her on the table and repeated the foregoing acts. Defendant
allowed the child to return home after she twice requested
him to let her go. Before defendant took her into the house,
and again while they were inside, he told the prosecutrix that
he would get her an ice cream cone.
A boatswain in the Coast Guard and his wife occupied
rooms in the prosecutrix's home. The boatswain arrived home
that afternoon at about 2 :30 p. m. and heard the prosecutrix
complaining to his wife that someone had done something
"bad to her." Shortly thereafter, the prosecutrix saw defendant walking alongside her home with an ice cream cone
in his ltand. She pointed the man out to the boatswain, who
went outside and asked defendant if he had taken the child
into the abandoned house. Defendant replied that he had not,
but stated that he had asked her if she wanted an ice cream
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cone. During the conversation defendant offered the nn •• ~......
a drink from a bottle of whiskey.
Defendant testified in his own behalf, stating that at .
time of the alleged offenses he had been in a saloon.
drinking some beer he proceeded to his home, situated.
that of the prosecutrix. Defendant testified that on the
home he purchased a bottle of whiskey and an ice cream
The ice cream was for his landlord's grandchild.
stated that he "always brought something home" for
child. As defendant walked by the prosecutrix's house,
boatswain asked defendant for the ice cream.
offered the boatswain a drink of whiskey but the DOIlLtsl1fa
wanted the ice cream, saying" I want to take it in and
to a child." Defendant replied, "That is what I got it
child." Nevertheless, the boatswain took the ice cream
defendant.
[1] Defendant contends that the evidence is ......... u.wl\a~
to support the verdict, on the ground that the t.p"tin,nY1I17:fj
the prosecutrix is "Sl) vague, uncertain and
to clearly indicate her inability to accurately remember
relate facts, and by reason thereof her testimony is
worthy of belief." As illustrative of his contention,
ant points to the prosecutrix's testimony that there
days in a week; that the incidents complained of oc('~nrlred
November or December, whereas they actually "{O~,,,,....piI
September; and that the man who committed the acts
smaller than her father, whereas prosecutrix's father
about 80 pounds less than defendant. Defendant COIllSideJ;
the prosecutrix's testimony impeached by her statements
ing cross-examination that defendant wore a red
whereas she testified at the preliminary examination that
did not think he wore a necktie. Defendant also COJlteJll~
that the prosecutrix was coached on the grounds that
persons (presumably one or two police officers and a reYlre.!1el
tative of the district attorney) helped her "remember
story" and that she testified that she knew the incidents
eurred on a Saturday because her mother told her so.
In all its important phases, the prosecutrix's story is
herent and consistent. Her version of the incident
unimpeached in all its essentials on cross-examination.
declared unequivocally that her mother did not tell her
to say. The statement by the prosecutrix that about .tln-ee:::.
persons helped her "remember her story" was in the
of an affirmative response to a question put by defendant

/
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[31 C.2d &55; 191 P.2d 1)

cross-examination. A reading of the entire record does not
reveal instances of coaching, except in the use of the words
"private parts" by the child. The defendant could show no
more than that the prosecutrix had discussed the affair with
several persons in authority. Since the testimony of the prosecutrix was, so far as the record shows, worthy of belief, minor
inconsistencies not destructive of her story were for the jury
to pass upon.
[2] Defendant contends· that evidence prejudicial to the
defendant was erroneously admitted. A police officer testified
that on September 15th, the day of the offense, he was taken
by the prosecutrix to the abandoned house where the child
showed him how "she entered the house with the man, unknown to us at that time, and showed us where he had set
her on the table and also where he had laid heron the couch
in the kitchen." Defendant contends that this testimony,
even if considered as a "fresh complaint," went too far in
that it contained the details of the complaint, instead of the
fact of complaint and nothing more, and that it was inadmissible hearsay. Defendant, however, did not object to the admission of the foregoing evidence, and it would be technical
in the extreme to hold that the officer's repetition of the child's
statement in this case was anything but a minor incident in
the trial, without importance when the record is read in' its
entirety.
[3] Defendant contends that the admission of evidence
pertaining to certain nonjudicial identification of defendant
was erroneous. The prosecutrix testified that she identified
defendant in a police lineup, and a police officer testified
that he was present when the prosecutrix made the identification. Here again, defendant made no objection to the introduction of the testimony of which he now complains, but even
if he had this evidence of previous nonjudicial identification
would have been admissible.
"Ordinarily, when a witness is asked to identify the assailant, or thief, or other person who is the subject of his testitnony, the witness' act of pointing out the accused (or other
person), then and there in the courtroom, is of little testimonial force. After all that has intervened, it would seldom
happen that the witness would not have come to believe in
the person's identity. The failure to recognize would tell for
the accused; but the affirmative recognition might mean little
against him.
.
"The psychology of the situation is practically the same as

/
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when Recent Contrivance is alleged. To corroborate the wit-:,'
ness, therefore, it is entirely proper . . . to prove that at ~.
former time, when the suggestions of others could not have',
intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness';
mind, he recognized and declared the present accused to be
the person. If, moreover (as sometimes is done) the person,
was then so placed among others that all probability of Bug- .
gestion (by seeing him hand-cu1fed, for example) is still
further removed, the evidence becomes stronger. The typical
illustration is that of the identification of an accused person,
at the time of arrest .•.• tt (4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed) ..;,
p. 208.)
~
The foregoing rule stated by Wigmore is not accepted in'
all jurisdictions, but the weight of recent authority is in accord'
with his views. (See, 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence (11th',
ed.), p. 691; anno., 70 A.L.R. 910.) Conflicting lines of authority have arisen in California on this point. One group
of cases holds that the admission of evidence of previous identification is erroneous, but in each case the defendant either
failed to object or the court held that the error was not pre- '
judicial. (People v. GKfOR, 117 Cal.App. 469, 472 [4 P.2d
247] ; People v. ~tm, 121 Cal.App. 61, 65 [8 P.2d 490]: ,
PeopZe v. Lave'Mler, 187 Cal.App. 582, 592 [31 P.2d 439].;·~
People v. Dyer, 80 Oal.App.2d 590, 593 [86 P.2d 852].) An~;
other group of eases holds that testimony of previous identi-l
fication is admissible, particularly where the eyewitness has
first identified the defendant in the courtroom. (People v,:'
Hale, 64 Oal.App. 5~3, 527 [222 P. 148]; People v. GarcilJ,
83 Oal.App. 463, 468 [256 P. 876] ; People v. Sa'Vage, 66 Oal: "
App.2d 237, 245-246 [152 P.2d 240]; People v. Bichardson"
74 Oal.App.2d 528, 542 [169P.2d 44].) The only case decided :;
by this court that deals with the question holds without discussion that mch identification is admissible. (People v.
Sieber, 201 Oal. 341, 349 [257 P. 64].) We therefore conclude
that the evidenee by the prosecutrix that she identified defendant in a lineup after the offense was admissible to corroborate
her story and to rebut the suggestion that her identification at
the trial was tJJe result of recent contrivance. The same considerations apply to the testimony of the police officer that he
saw the witnts identify defendant.
[4] The boatswain was permitted to testify, over objection,
that the child pointed the defendant out to him shortly after
she complained of defendant's acts, and at the time she saw
him walking 8e&1' her house carrying the ice cream cone.
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(31 C.2d !lS5: 191 P.2d 1)

Again, the identification of defendant by the prosecutrix is
admissible to corroborate her testimony. Defendant contends,
however, that the identification is unreliable on the ground
that the prosecutrix identified not himself but the ice cream;
that she merely associated him with the wrongdoer because
he was carrying an ice cream cone. Defendant's argument
that the identification was erroneous constitutes the basis of
his defense and was resolved against him by the jury. The
identification was not unreliable, and it was properly admitted
for the consideration of the jury. The identification was
made during or immediately after the child's complaint to
the boatswain, and there is no indication that the child was
coached when she pointed out the defendant to the boatswain.
There are doubtless many instances where previous identification would be inadmissible because of the unreliable character
of the identification, but here the prosecutrix's recognition
of defendant occurred only a short time after the offense, and
it was made independently on her part.
[5] The boatswain testified that he saw defendant outside
the house soon after the incident and that defendant admitted
purchasing the ice cream cone for the prosecutrix. He also
testified, without objection that he identified defendant in a
police lineup as the person to whom he spoke outside the house.
Here, again, the testimony of previous identification was admissible to corroborate the witness's testimony of identification
at the trial.
[6] It is contended that defendant was improperly convicted of violating both section 288 and section 288a of the
Penal Code; that under the rule expressed in PeopZe v. O,.ee,.,
30 Ca1.2d 589 [184 P.2d 512], defendant should have been
convicted only of a violation of section 288. In Peciple v.
Gree,., the defendant was convicted at his first trial of a violation. of Welfare and Institutions Code, section 702 (contributing to the delinquency of a minor) and at a later trial of violations of Penal Code, section 261(1) (statutory rape) and
section 288 (lewd and lascivious conduct). We held that if
the act upon which these charges were based was the same
for all three offenses, defendant could be convicted only of the
section 702 offense since that offense is included in the offenses
defined by section 288 and section 261(1). We further held
that sinee section 288 specifically includes acts constituting
other crimes mentioned in part one of the Penal Code, a
person cannot be convicted of both a violation of section 288
and a violation of section 261 (1) for the same act. The reason-
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ing of the Greer case would apply to the present one if
charges in both counts were based upon the same act,
section 288a is in part one of the Penal Code. We have
eluded, however, that both counts in the present lW.onB&lJQ
are based upon separate acts.
The opinion in People v. Greer states that: "The U.Vll. . . . . . . .
ity of acts in cases involving sex offenses is not easily 8US,ctIII~
tible of exact definition. The cases show no uniformity
this field, and there are many instances of artificial QlS'tuij~
tions. The rule can be set down for the guidance of the
court in the present case, however, that if the touching of
prosecutrix's body charged in the first information ["..>o'r.,........,
a violation of section 702] was essentially such touching.
would be considered a part of the rape itself, it could
serve as a basis for a separate conviction. If, on the other"
hand, it was clearly not a part of the rape, but a part of .:'
separate course of conduct, it could be held a separate offense.'~
(PeopZe v. Greer, supra, at p. 600; see also, 57 Yale L.J;'
132.) We stated also that the defendant in that case could
not be convicted of violations of both section 261 (1) and sec-,:
tion 288, because the act forming the basis for the charge under
section 261(1) was the same as the act forming the basis f~i:
the charge under section 288. "Except for the rape itself,:
the only act of which she accused defendant was the forcible,
removal of her underclothing immediately preceding the rape.
To hold that the removal of the prosecutrix's underclothing ,
constitutes an act separate from the rape, however, would be'
artificial in the present context and would permit double punishment not authorized or contemplated by section 288."
(People v. Greer, supra, at p. 604.)
In the present case defendant committed certain acts that
eould be considered rape or attempted rape; these acts clearly
support the conviction for violation of section 288. The effect
of the amended section 288 is to permit the charging of lewd
and lascivious conduct on the basis of acts that also constitute
other crimes provided for in part one of the code. (People
v. Greer, ..pra, at p. 602.) In addition, however, defendant
also coinmitted certain acts denounced by section 288a. ThuB,
this case is factually dissimilar to People v. Greer. Here, defendant eould have been convicted of two crimes without resort to section 288; in People v. Greer, the defendant could
have been eonvicted only of a violation of either sec~ion 261 (1)
or section 288, for the basis of his conviction in either case
would depend upon the same act.

)
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It is true that the acts in the present ease were all committed
within a relatively short time. Nevertheless, defendant committed acts separately denounced in two code sections, independent of section 288, and these offenses are not necessarily
or even normally associated with each other.
The acts forming the basis for the charge under section
288 were not mere fondling and touching preparatory to the
commission of the acts denounced by section 288a. No question would arise if defendant had been charged with rape or
attempted rape and with a violation of section 288a, since there
is evidence that he committed both offenses and neither is included in the other. The same result may be reached by
charging one of the offenses under section 288. Under such
circumstances we are compelled to conclude that the two offenses charged in the information are separate ones, just as
mayhem can be separate from rape even though it may have
occurred during an episode involving rape.
The judgmeBt and order are affirmed.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J 0, concurred.

